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In John Calvin’s Geneva, as much as today, marriage was a contract between a 
fit man and a fit woman of the age of consent.  Marriage was much more than a contract.  
It was also a spiritual, social, natural, and economic unit that could involve many other 
parties besides the couple.  But marriage was never less than a contract.  It could not be 
created unless both the man and the woman properly consented to and celebrated this 
union.  This Article analyzes the new Geneva theology and law of marriage contracts and 
marital property contracts both as set out in statutes and formal treatises and 
implemented by the Genevan consistory.  Notable are the Genevan authorities' deep 
concern for freedom and capacity of both parties to enter engagement and marriage 
contracts, the dramatic changes they introduced in the mandatory wedding liturgy, and 
the complex laws and customs concerning engagement gifts, dowers, and dowries that 
they adopted and adapted often under Calvin's direct influence. 
 
 
1 This article represents work in progress on a multi-volume project with Robert M. Kingdon, Sex, Marriage 
and Family in John Calvin's Geneva.  The first volume, subtitled Courtship, Betrothal, and Marriage, is due 
in print in the fall of 2005.  
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Introduction 
Marriage was one of the hotly contested issues of the sixteenth-century Protestant 
Reformation, and one of the first institutions to be reformed.  The leading Protestant 
theologians – Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon, Thomas Cranmer and William 
Tyndale, Martin Bucer and John Calvin – all prepared lengthy tracts on the subject in their 
first years of reform.   Scores of leading jurists took up legal questions of marriage in their 
consilia and commentaries, often working under the direct inspiration of Protestant 
theology and theologians.  Virtually every city and territory that converted to the Protestant 
cause in the first half of the sixteenth century had new marriage laws on the books within 
a decade of its acceptance of the Reformation.2  
The Protestant reformers early preoccupation with marriage was driven in part by 
their theology.  Many of the core issues of the Reformation were implicated by the 
prevailing sacramental theology and canon law of marriage.  The Catholic Church’s 
jurisdiction over marriage was, for the reformers, a particularly flagrant example of the 
Church’s usurpation of the magistrate’s authority.  The Catholic sacramental concept of 
marriage, on which the Church predicated its jurisdiction, was for the reformers a self-
serving theological fiction.  The canonical prohibition on marriage of clergy and monastics 
stood sharply juxtaposed to Protestant doctrines of sexual sin and the Christian vocation.  
The canon law’s long roll of impediments to betrothal and marriage, its prohibitions 
against complete divorce and remarriage, and its close regulations of sexuality, parenting, 
and education all stood in considerable tension with the reformers’ understanding of the 
Bible.  That a child could enter marriage without parental permission or church 
consecration betrayed, in the reformers’ views, basic responsibilities of family, church, 
and state to children.  Issues of marriage doctrine and law thus implicated and epitomized 
many of the cardinal theological issues of the Protestant Reformation.  
The reformers’ early preoccupation with marriage was also driven, in part, by their 
politics.  A number of early leaders of the Reformation faced aggressive prosecution by 
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Lutheran Reformation (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 177-256; id., From 
Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster 





the Catholic Church and its political allies for violation of the canon law of marriage and 
celibacy.  Among the earliest Protestant leaders were ex-priests and ex-monastics who 
had forsaken their orders and vows, and often married shortly thereafter.  Indeed, one of 
the acts of solidarity with the new Protestant cause was to marry or divorce in open 
violation of the canon law and in defiance of a bishop’s instructions.  As Catholic Church 
courts began to prosecute these canon law offences, Protestant theologians and jurists 
rose to the defense of their co-religionists – producing a welter of briefs, letters, sermons, 
and pamphlets that denounced traditional norms and pronounced a new theology of 
marriage. 
Protestant theologians treated marriage not as a sacramental institution of the 
heavenly kingdom, but as a social estate of the earthly kingdom.  Marriage, they taught, 
served the goods and goals of mutual love and support of husband and wife, mutual 
procreation and nurture of children, and mutual protection of both spouses from sexual 
sin.  All adult persons, preachers and others alike, should pursue the calling of marriage, 
for all were in need of the comforts of marital love and of the protection from sexual sin.  
When properly structured and governed, the marital household served as a model of 
authority, charity, and pedagogy in the earthly kingdom and as a vital instrument for the 
reform of church, state, and society.  Parents served as “bishops” to their children.  
Siblings served as priests to each other.  The household altogether – particularly the 
Christian household of the married minister – was a source of “evangelical impulses” in 
society.3   
Though divinely created and spiritually edifying, however, marriage and the family 
remained a social estate of the earthly kingdom, of the present life.  All parties could 
partake of this institution, regardless of their faith.  Though it was subject to divine law 
and clerical counseling, marriage came within the jurisdiction of the magistrate not the 
cleric, of the civil law not the canon law.  The magistrate, as God’s vice-regent of the 
earthly kingdom, was to set the laws for marriage formation, maintenance, and 
dissolution.  
Political leaders rapidly translated this new Protestant gospel into civil law.  Just 
as the civil act of marriage often came to signal a person’s conversion to Protestantism, 
so the Civil Marriage Act came to symbolize a political community’s acceptance of the 
new Protestant theology of marriage.  These new civil laws included a number of 
important innovations triggered by the new Protestant theology of marriage.  But they also 
ultimately retained a good deal of the medieval canon law and civil law.  
 
 
3 The quote is from Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young in the German 





Geneva followed this general pattern of Protestant reform.  On May 21, 1536, the 
Genevan authorities renounced the canon law in favor of “the holy Evangelical Law and 
Word of God.”4  The local prince-bishop was forced to leave along with the canon lawyers 
who had staffed the bishop’s court and had applied the canon law of marriage in the 
diocese. Two months later, John Calvin arrived in Geneva, armed with a copy of his new 
Institutes of the Christian Religion in which he, too, renounced the traditional theology 
and canon law of marriage, and called for the reformation of marriage “root, trunk, and 
branch.”5  The Genevan city councils began to issue new statutes on discrete marriage 
questions almost immediately thereafter.  These early laws culminated in a detailed 
Marriage Ordinance, drafted by Calvin and others in 1545, and revised in 1546.  The 
authorities also mandated the use of a new Marriage Liturgy that Calvin had drafted in 
1542 and issued in expanded form in 1545.  These and other laws were enforced both 
by the Council of Geneva and by the Consistory, a new institution comprised of both 
ministers and magistrates. 
These new Genevan ordinances introduced a number of important changes to the 
prevailing law of marriage.  Betrothal and marriage contracts became harder to make and 
harder to annul.  Both public banns and church weddings were made essential to the 
validity of a marriage. The wedding liturgy itself was heavily reworked to emphasize 
biblical instruction and congregational participation.  The law of marital property – 
betrothal gifts, dower, and dowry – changed rather little.  But the Genevan authorities 
would not annul engagement or marriage contracts that were conditioned on delivery of 
marital property, even if the betrothed parties and their families fell into bitter dispute.  
Betrothal and Marriage Contracts 
Calvin introduced most of the reforms of betrothal and marriage contracts in his 
1546 Marriage Ordinance.6  Like the medieval canonists, Calvin started with the principle 
of freedom of marital contract.  Marriage, he insisted, depended in its essence on the 
 
 
4 Les sources du droit du canton de Genève, ed. Emile Rivoire and Victor van Berchem, 4 vols. (Aarau, 
1927-1935), vol. 2, item no. 701 [hereafter SD].  Only a decade before the city council had unequivocally 
confirmed its support for the church's jurisdiction over marriage.  Statute of December 20, 1528, in SD, vol. 
2, item no. 621; see also ibid., item no. 571 (a November 13, 1521 confirmation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
by Charles II, Duke of Savoy).  See Walter Köhler, Zϋrcher Ehegericht und Genfer Konsistorium, 2 vols. 
(Leipzig, 1942), 2:514-515, 541-555.   
5 John Calvin, Ioannis Calvini Institutio Religionis Christianae (Basel, 1536), in Ioannis Calvini opera quae 
supersunt omnia, ed. G. Baum, et al., 59 vols.  (Brunswick, 1863-1900) (Corpus Reformatorum Series, 
vols. 29-87), 1:192-195 [hereafter CO], translated as John Calvin, Institution of the Christian Religion, trans.  
Ford Lewis Battles (Atlanta, 1975), 236-240.   
6 The 1545 draft is in CO 10/1:33-44, the 1546 draft in Jean-Francois Bergier and Robert M. Kingdon, eds., 
Registres de la compagnie des pasteurs de Genève au temps de Calvin, 2 vols. (Geneva: Droz, 1964), 
1:30-38.  The 1546 version was used by the authorities from the start, but it was not formally promulgated 





mutual consent of both the man and the woman.  Absent proof of free consent by both 
parties there was no marriage.  Calvin defended this principle repeatedly in his later 
commentaries and sermons. “While all contracts ought to be voluntary, freedom ought to 
prevail especially in marriage, so that no one may pledge his faith against his will.”7  “God 
considers that compulsory and forced marriages never come to a good end.... [I]f the 
husband and the wife are not in mutual agreement and do not love each other, this is a 
profanation of marriage, and not a marriage at all, properly speaking.  For the will is the 
principal bond.”8  When a woman wishes to marry, she must thus not “be thrust into it 
reluctantly or compelled to marry against her will, but left to her own free choice.”9  “When 
a man is going to marry and he takes a wife, let him take her of his own free will, knowing 
that where there is not a true and pure love, there is nothing but disorder, and one can 
expect no grace from God.”10   
Also following medieval canonists, Calvin distinguished between contracts of 
betrothal and contracts of marriage – betrothals and espousals as he called them, 
following the tradition.  Betrothals were future promises to be married.  Espousals were 
present promises to be married.   But, unlike the medieval canonists, Calvin removed the 
need for the parties to use specific formulaic words: any clear indication of consent would 
do.  He softened the distinction and shortened the duration between betrothals and 
espousals.  He insisted that these contracts be both public and private in nature.   And he 
would not declare a marriage valid merely on proof of that a betrothed couple had 
consummated their union; a church wedding was still required.  
Because the consent of the couple was the essence of the betrothal contract, 
Calvin took pains to secure it in the 1546 Marriage Ordinance.  Betrothal promises had to 
be made “simply” and “honorably in the fear of God.”  Such betrothals were to be initiated 
by “a sober proposal” from the man, accepted by the woman, and witnessed by at least 
two persons of “good reputation.” Betrothals made in secret, qualified with onerous 
conditions, or procured by coercion, fraud, or deceit were automatically annulled – and 
the couple themselves, and any accomplices in their wrongdoing, could face punishment.  
Betrothals procured through trickery or “surprise,” or made “frivolously, as when merely 
touching glasses when drinking together,” could be annulled on petition by either party.  
Betrothal promises extracted by or from children below the age of consent were 
presumptively invalid, though children could confirm them upon reaching majority.  
Betrothals involving a newcomer to the city were not valid until the parties produced proof 
 
 
7 Comm. Josh. 15:14.  
8 Serm. Deut. 25:5-12. 
9 Comm. Gen. 24:57. 





of the newcomer’s integrity of character and eligibility for marriage.  Absent such proof, 
the couple had to wait a year before they could marry. 
The consent of the couple’s parents, or their guardians, was also vital to the validity 
of the betrothal.  The consent of fathers was the more critical; the consent of mothers was 
required only when fathers were absent, and would be respected only if (male) relatives 
would concur in her views.  In the absence of both parents, guardians would give their 
consent, again with priority for the male voice.  Minor children – men under 20, women 
under 18 – who became betrothed marriage without such parental consent could have 
their betrothals unilaterally annulled by either set of parents or guardians.  Adult or 
emancipated children could proceed without their parents’ consent, though “it is more 
fitting that they should always let themselves be governed by the advice of their fathers.”   
The Ordinance made clear that parental consent was a supplement to, not a 
substitute for, the consent of the couple themselves.  Parents were prohibited, on pain of 
imprisonment, from coercing their children into unwanted betrothals or marriages, or 
withholding their consent or payment of dowry until the child chose a favorite partner.  
They were further prevented from forcing youngsters into marriage before they were 
mature enough to consent to and participate safely in the institution.  Minor children 
“observing a modest and reverend spirit,” could refuse to follow their parents’ insistence 
on an unwanted partner or a premature betrothal.  Other children, confronting a “negligent 
or excessively strict” father, could “have him compelled to give a dowry” in support of their 
marriage.   
The consent of the broader state and church community also played a part in the 
betrothals.  Betrothed couples were to register with a local civil magistrate, who would 
post notices of their pending nuptials and furnish the couple with a signed marriage 
certificate.  Couples were to file this registration thereafter with a local church, whose 
pastor was to announce their banns from the pulpit on three successive Sundays.  Such 
widespread notice was an open invitation for fellow parishioners and citizens alike to 
approve of the match or to voice their objections.  Any objections to the betrothal could 
be raised at this point.   But all such objections had to be voiced privately to the Consistory, 
and only by citizens or by persons of good reputation.  Such precautions helped to avoid 
the prospect of “defamation or injustice,” particularly “to an honorable girl.”  Those who 
objected in an untimely or improper manner could be sued for defamation by the couple 
or their parents. A final call for objections to the marriage came during the wedding liturgy.   
While the Consistory was given wide discretion to review these objections, the 
strong presumption was that betrothal contracts, once properly made, could not be 
broken.  Objections that raised formal impediments, however, required closer scrutiny, 
and sometimes could result in orders of annulment, or at least delay of the wedding.  Of 
the numerous impediments to betrothal recognized at medieval canon law, the 1546 





disease or physical deformity; and (5) physical desertion by either party.  The Ordinance 
listed as an impediment to either betrothal or marriage: (6) discovery of the lack of 
presumed virginity.  Though the Ordinance was silent on the question, in practice, Calvin 
and the Consistory also raised to the level of an impediment to betrothal: (7) lack of 
consent by either the man or woman; (8) lack of parental consent to a minor’s marriage; 
(9) bodily fornication with another by either betrothed party; and (10) failure of condition 
that went to the essence of marriage.  The Ordinance did not list, and the Consistory did 
not  recognize, various other impediments to betrothal recognized at canon law – 
expiration of time; cruelty or dissent towards a fiancé(e); special affinity; spiritual 
fornication; a man’s entry into the clergy; either party’s vow of chastity; or dissolution by 
mutual consent of the betrothed couple.   
The removal of this last canon law impediment to betrothal, dissolution of the 
betrothal by mutual consent of the couple, was particularly surprising.  The medieval 
canonists had introduced this impediment not to encourage transient troth but to give 
parties a final chance to walk away from the budding union if their relationship did not 
work out, or if they and their families fell into dispute, say, over money or marital property 
which were often points of real contention.  Calvin and his colleagues provided no such 
escape.  Where the parties gave their mutual consent to engagement but then later 
changed their minds, the Consistory held them to their promises.  Even if the parties were 
now fundamentally at odds and both wanted out of their engagement, Calvin and the 
Consistory often ordered them to marry in accordance with their betrothal promises.  For 
a betrothal contract, once made, could not be broken unless the parties could prove 
another impediment.  If it had been properly formed, the engagement contract could not 
dissolved even by mutual consent.   
This rule underscored Calvin’s teaching that both betrothals and marriages were 
“sacred contracts” that could not be easily put asunder.  It also underscored Calvin’s 
repeated counsel that parties must meet, become well acquainted, and deliberate 
carefully with each other and their parents and peers before they became engaged to be 
married.11  To be sure, it was easier to get out of a betrothal than a marriage in 
Reformation Geneva, for the roll of impediments to betrothal was considerably longer 
than the roll of marital impediments.  But it was even easier to get out of a courtship.  
Either courting party could simply leave, or the parties could mutually agree to severe 
their relationship.   All this was a notable departure from the medieval tradition, which had 
allowed parties to dissolve engagement contracts by mutual consent.   What was a two-
stage process in the medieval tradition now became a three-stage process in Reformation 
Geneva – courtship, betrothal, and marriage.  
 
 





A Genevan couple, once properly betrothed, had little time to waste and little room 
to celebrate.  Neither their publicly announced betrothal nor the civil registration of their 
marriage was sufficient to constitute a marriage.  A formal church wedding had to follow 
– within six weeks of betrothal.  If the couple procrastinated in their wedding plans, they 
would be reprimanded by the Consistory; if they persisted, they would be “sent before the 
Council so that they may be compelled to celebrate it.”  If the prospective groom 
disappeared without cause, the woman was bound to her betrothal for a year.  If the 
prospective bride disappeared, the man could break off the betrothal immediately – 
unless there was evidence that she had been kidnapped or involuntarily detained. 
Cohabitation and consummation, in the brief period prior to the wedding, were strictly 
forbidden to the parties, on pain of imprisonment.  Pregnant brides to be, though spared 
prison, were required with their fiancés to do public confession for their fornication prior 
to the wedding, and to wear a veil and no flowers on their wedding day to signal their sin.  
Weddings were to be “modest affairs,” “maintaining the decorum and gravity befitting 
Christians.”   Wedding parties were to celebratory, but sober, without drunkenness, 
dancing, or debauchery. 
Marriage Liturgies 
Calvin’s 1545 Marriage Liturgy elaborated the rules and rites of weddings.12   
Marriages without weddings were invalid in Reformation Geneva.  “The public and 
solemn” wedding ceremony was “essential” for a marriage to be “true and lawful,” Calvin 
put it in the 1542 draft of his Marriage Liturgy.13  “No marriages are lawful, except those 
that are rightly consecrated,” he repeated in 1554.14   
For Calvin and his colleagues, weddings were essential confirmations not only that 
the couple privately consented but also that the church and the state publicly consented 
to the marriage.  All weddings had to be announced in advance by the publication of 
banns.  These banns were signed by a local magistrate and declared by a local minister 
for three successive Sundays before the wedding.  Weddings took place in the church 
where the banns were pronounced – on Sunday or on a weekday when a public Bible 
lecture was scheduled.  Weddings could not be held on the same Sunday for which the 
Eucharist was scheduled lest “the honor of the sacrament” be impugned.  The local 
minister presided over the wedding following a detailed liturgy that Calvin drafted.  
Marriages that had been secretly contracted or improperly celebrated elsewhere had to 
be announced and celebrated anew in a church wedding in Geneva.  
 
 
12 CO 6:203-208.  The 1545 edition largely repeats the 1542 edition but adds a lengthy preface and further 
instructions.  Later editions of 1547, 1558, 1559, 1562, 1563, and 1566 are the same, except for small 
variations of wording.  
13 CO 6:203-204. 





The banns were written announcements of the party’s pending wedding plans. 
They were usually read by the minister from the pulpit during the Sunday worship service.  
The publication of banns was an ancient practice of the church.  What was new in 
Geneva, compared to late medieval Catholic practice, was that the publication of banns 
was mandatory for every wedding.  Marriages were not valid without weddings, and 
weddings could not proceed without banns.  What was also new in Geneva, compared to 
some other Protestant communities, was that banns were to be announced in the church, 
not in the public square or in city hall.  A city official, called a syndic, had to sign the banns 
after the parties registered their betrothal in the local town hall.  But the minister had to 
pronounce these signed banns in the church where the parties intended to be married.  
This underscored a central point of Calvin’s marriage theology – that marriages were at 
once public and private, spiritual and temporal, ecclesiastical and political in nature. 
The permission to celebrate weddings on any day, save on a Sunday when the 
Eucharist was celebrated, was a marked departure from the late medieval Catholic 
tradition.  Prior to the Reformation, the prince-bishop of Geneva prohibited weddings on 
any of the sixty odd holy days on the medieval religious calendar, as well as throughout 
the period of Lent. Several local synods also prohibited weddings on Sundays and 
discouraged them on Fridays.15  But when church weddings were celebrated, the 
Eucharist had to be included in the wedding liturgy.  Calvin and his colleagues eliminated 
most holy days, and softened considerably the Lenten restrictions, freeing up days for 
weddings.16  But, more to the point, they allowed weddings on any days that the 
congregation gathered to hear biblical exposition – whether the Sunday sermon or the 
weekday lecture on biblical texts.  This underscored an accent that Calvin’s liturgy spelled 
out in more detail: Weddings were congregational events that featured exposition of the 
Bible not celebration of a sacrament.  
Calvin’s wedding liturgy moved in three phases: 1) biblical exhortation on marriage 
and its duties; 2) the consent of the couple and congregation and exchange of vows; and 
3) blessing, prayer, and further exhortation.   
In the first phase, the minister offered the couple a rich mosaic of biblical teachings 
on marriage, citing and paraphrasing a dozen Old and New Testament passages.  Man 
and woman were created for each other.  The two shall become one flesh.  Their voluntary 
union shall be permanent.  The wife shall subject herself to her husband.  Both husband 
 
 
15 See examples in J.B. Molin and P. Mutembe, Le Rituel du mariage en France du XIIe au XVIe siècle 
(Paris, 1994); Kenneth W. Stevenson, Worship: Wonderful and Sacred Mystery (Washington, DC, 1992).   
16 Philip Benedict, Christ’s Churches Purely Reformed: A Social History of Calvinism (New Haven/London, 





and wife shall surrender their bodies to each other.  Marriage protects both parties from 
lust.  Their bodies are temples of the Lord to be maintained in purity.   
After this lengthy opening exhortation, the minister moved to the second phase, 
asking the man and the woman separately whether they each consented to the marriage 
as so described.  Part of the concern was to ensure that both the man and the woman 
fully and freely consented to the marriage – and were not pursuing this marriage 
frivolously, fraudulently, or under any false illusions.  Part of the concern was to ensure 
that each party had a detailed understanding of the nature and responsibility of the 
marriage institution they were about to enter.  The minister also asked the congregation 
whether they consented to the union, or knew of any impediment.  With all confirming 
their consent to go forward, the minister then administered the vows.  Some of the 
phraseology of the vows will be familiar to Protestants today.  But note that these vows 
were taken before God and his congregation, and that the parties were bound by God’s 
word.  Note, too, the disparities in the duties the husband and wife owe each other.  
Do you, N., confess here before God and his holy congregation that you 
have taken and take for your wife and spouse N. here present, whom you 
promise to protect, loving and maintaining her faithfully, as is the duty of a 
true and faithful husband to his wife, living piously with her, keeping faith 
and loyalty to her in all things, according to the holy Word of God and his 
holy Gospel? 
 
Do you, N., confess here before God and his holy assembly that you have 
taken and take N. for your lawful husband, whom you promise to obey, 
serving and being subject to him, living piously, keeping faith and loyalty to 
him in all things, as a faithful and loyal wife should to her husband, according 
to the Word of God and the holy Gospel? 
 
The third phase of the liturgy combined blessing, prayer, and further biblical 
exhortation.  The minister called on God to bless the new couple in the “holy estate” and 
“noble estate” to which “God the Father had called” them “for the love of Jesus Christ his 
Son.”  The minister quoted the familiar passage of Matthew 19:3-9, with its solemn 
warning “what God has joined together, let no man put asunder.”  He enjoined the couple 
to live together in “loving kindness, peace, and union, preserving true charity, faith, and 
loyalty to each other according to the Word of God.”  The minister then led the couple and 
the congregation in a lengthy prayer.  The prayer repeated much of the language of the 
opening biblical exhortation.  It also called upon God to help the couple live together in 
holiness, purity, and uprightness, and to set good examples of Christian piety for each 
other and the broader community.  The parties and congregation were then blessed with 





Compared to other Catholic and Protestant liturgies of the day, Calvin’s wedding 
liturgy was long on instruction and short on ceremony.  The liturgy was amply peppered 
throughout with choice biblical references, quotations, and paraphrases.  The liturgy 
began and ended with lengthy biblical teachings on the respective duties of husband and 
wife.  More biblical instruction was offered in the regular sermon for the day that followed 
immediately after the marriage liturgy.  The lengthy vows again confirmed each party’s 
godly duties in marriage as did the concluding prayer.  There was no Eucharist, no 
kneeling at the altar, no ritualistic clasping of hands, no lifting of the veil, no kissing of the 
bride, no exchange of rings, no delivery of coins, no music or singing – all of which were 
featured in other wedding liturgies of the day.17  The Genevan wedding liturgy was to 
proceed, the preamble insisted, “respectably, religiously, and properly in good and decent 
order,” so that the couple can “hear and listen to the holy Word of God that will be 
administered to them.”  
Calvin’s wedding liturgy was a “beautiful collection of biblical texts,” writes a 
leading historian of liturgy.18  It was also a surprising collection – and not just because of 
its length and the number of biblical passages adduced.  First, only two of the three 
traditional goods of marriage were referenced in the liturgy – mutual love and 
companionship and mutual protection from sexual sin.  Nothing was said anywhere in the 
liturgy about the blessing and procreation of children.  Though the liturgy referred to 
Genesis 1, it did not, like so many other wedding liturgies, quote the familiar biblical 
instruction: “Be fruitful and multiply” (Gen. 1:28).  Second, the natural qualities and duties 
of marriage were emphasized more than the spiritual.  The opening exhortation did speak 
of “honorable holy matrimony instituted by God” and the “sacred” obedience that a wife 
owed her husband.  The final blessing did speak of the “holy estate” and “noble estate” 
of marriage.  But much of the biblical exhortation, oaths, and final prayer were focused 
on the natural qualities of marriage – its origins in creation, the mandate of fleshly union, 
the need for mutual bodily sacrifice, the command of continence, the analogy of the body 
as the temple of God, the need for bodily purity.  Not even the familiar analogies between 
marriage and the covenant between Yahweh and His elect or Christ and His Church were 
referenced.  These emphases – together with the express prohibition on any Eucharistic 
celebration during the wedding, or even on the day of the wedding – underscored Calvin’s 
fervent belief that marriage was both a natural and spiritual estate, but it was not a 
sacrament.   
 
 
17 See samples in Mark Searle and Kenneth W. Stevenson, Documents of the Marriage Liturgy 
(Collegeville, Minn., 1992); Molin and Mutembe, Le Rituel du mariage. 





Calvin’s marriage liturgy made clear that the formation of marriage was a 
fundamental concern of the church community.19  For three Sundays before the wedding, 
the church proclaimed the banns, which served as a general invitation not only for anyone 
to raise impediments, but also for everyone to attend the wedding service.  The wedding 
liturgy took place during a worship service.  The wedding took place in the church – not 
at the church door, as was customary in some late medieval liturgies, and certainly not in 
a private home as was also customary in some Protestant and Catholic communities.20  
The minister’s duty, reads the preamble to the Marriage Liturgy, was “to approve and 
confirm this marriage before the whole assembly.”  The congregation was asked to 
consent to the marriage.  Both the husband and wife were asked both to confirm their 
consent and to swear their vows again “before God and his holy assembly.”  The 
congregation was asked to join in congregational prayer for the blessing of the couple.  
While the minister presided at the wedding, he stood with the couple on the same level, 
not on the pulpit.  His head was uncovered.  He faced the couple and congregation 
throughout the ceremony.  He made no turn to the altar as had been customary in 
medieval liturgies.  And the entire liturgy was in the vernacular language, so that all could 
understand what they were participating in.  All this underscores that in Calvin’s Geneva 
a wedding liturgy was very much a church affair, a public congregational event.  Even the 
couple’s parents and relatives had no special place in the wedding liturgy.  
Calvin did not create his wedding liturgy from whole cloth.  A good bit of this liturgy 
came from the “radical revision” introduced in Geneva by Guillaume Farel in 1533.21  And 
Farel’s wedding liturgy built, in part, on liturgical reforms introduced in the 1520s in Bern, 
Strasbourg, Zurich, and other Protestant cities.22  Calvin downplayed the novelty of his 
wedding liturgy.  When the Council of Bern later charged him with liturgical iconoclasm, 
Calvin insisted: “The form of marriage has always remained in its original state, and I 
follow the order which I found established like one who takes no pleasure in making 
innovations.”23  Calvin was being forgetful or perhaps too modest, for he had revised 
Farel’s 1533 liturgy.24  But Calvin also did not care so much about the exact form of the 
liturgy.  Wedding liturgies, he wrote, concerned “things indifferent [adiaphora], wherein 
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the churches have a certain latitude of diversity.”  “[W]hen one has weighed the matter 
carefully, it may be sometimes considered useful not to have too rigid a uniformity 
respecting them, in order to show that faith and Christianity do not consist in that.”25  The 
event of a church wedding liturgy was essential to the validity of marriage.  The exact 
form of the liturgy, however, was open to local variation.  
Marital Property 
In sixteenth-century Geneva, as much as today, marriage was not only a union of 
persons.  It was also a merger of properties – land, money, jewelry, clothing, household 
commodities, social titles, property rents, business interests, and sundry other 
“immovable” (“real”) property and “movable” (“personal”) property.  When the parties were 
members of the aristocracy or of the ruling class, a marriage could be the occasion for a 
massive exchange of power, property, and prerogatives that was distilled into lengthy 
written contracts.  But even paupers who intended marriage generally made at least token 
exchanges of property and oral agreements about future transactions.  
While these marital property contracts were often joined with betrothal and 
marriage contracts, they were actually independent agreements with different legal 
implications.  For the marriage to be valid, a marriage contract, an oral or written 
agreement by the couple to marry, was essential.  A marital property contract, an 
agreement to exchange property in anticipation or in consideration of marriage, was not 
essential.  Indeed, a marital property contract could be negotiated and executed by other 
parties besides the couple, such as their relatives, with or without confirmation or even 
mention of the betrothal or marriage.  To conjoin the marriage contract and marital 
property contract in one instrument was both prudent and efficient.  But it was not legally 
necessary.26   
Calvin and his fellow Genevan reformers made few changes in the prevailing ius 
commune on marital property.27 The ius commune distinguished three types of marital 
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property exchanges.  First, a man accompanied his betrothal proposal with some form of 
gift to the woman, and sometimes to her family.  At minimum, the man offered the woman 
a token gift to signify his affection and to seal his betrothal promise – a ring, hat, flower, 
feather, kerchief, pin, bottle of wine, or some form of earnest money.  A man of ample 
means could be more elaborate, offering expensive jewelry or clothing to his fiancée, or 
a horse and carriage to her or to her family.  These gifts of betrothal to the prospective 
bride (and her family) were a carryover of the Frankish and Germanic custom that a man 
paid a purchase price to the woman’s family for the right to marry her, often a rather hefty 
price.  By the sixteenth century, this once lucrative windfall to the bride’s family had 
become largely ceremonial.28  To be sure, a few women (and their families) could still 
insist on a more elaborate betrothal gift, particularly if the woman were highly coveted or 
if a marital tie to her family were highly prized.  But an elaborate betrothal gift was neither 
required nor customary in the sixteenth century.  
If the betrothal ripened into marriage, the betrothal gift vested.  It was now the 
woman’s property (or her family’s property, if they received the gift) to be used or disposed 
of without interference from the donor man, even after the marriage.  If the betrothal fell 
apart, however, it was customary for the woman (or her family) to return these gifts.  
Failure to return these gifts could lead to litigation in the secular courts for their recovery 
– particularly if the betrothal gift was an expensive piece of jewelry or clothing. 
Second, the woman, and her family, brought property into the marriage.  This was 
called her dowry (dos, dot).  The dowry consisted, at minimum, in the woman’s clothing 
and personal effects.  But the dowry usually involved a good deal more.  Frequently, it 
included other movable property such as household furnishings and decorations, cooking 
utensils and linens, poultry and cattle, standing orders for newly harvested fruit and grain, 
and more.  Sometimes, especially with an aristocratic marriage, the dowry was land, a 
house, a rental property, or a place of business.  The type and value of the dowry was 
open to negotiation between the couple and their families (or representatives).  But dowry 
was often a very expensive proposition for the woman and her family, and an ample 
source of tension for the couple and their families during the marital property negotiations.  
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It was not uncommon for the bride’s family to give the woman (a portion of) her inheritance 
in advance to meet the high costs of dowry.   
Once delivered, the woman’s dowry did not pass entirely beyond her control or 
that of her family.  A portion of the dowry, called the “marriage portion,” remained reserved 
to the woman and her family after the wedding; the remainder became the community 
property of the marriage.  The type and the amount of dowry property included in the 
marriage portion were open to negotiation between the couple and their families, but 
some portion (including the betrothal gift) was generally reserved, and stipulated clearly 
in the marital property contract.  The wife could retain custody of this marriage portion 
(particularly her betrothal gift), but usually the husband controlled all the marital property, 
including the marriage portion.  The property in the marriage portion, however, could not 
be sold, mortgaged, given away, or destroyed.  The wife and/or her family had the right 
to retrieve the marriage portion when the marriage ended by annulment or death.  They 
could also request the authorities to assign a tuteur over wastrel husbands who were 
suspected of squandering or damaging the wife’s marriage portion.  If the marriage 
portion had been invested, they could seek a portion of the profits as well, which was 
called the accrual (addendum).  If the marriage portion had been damaged or destroyed, 
they could seek restitution of its value from the husband’s own property.  Once retrieved, 
the marriage portion and its accrual was redistributed within the wife’s family, with the 
wife herself (if she survived) and her children given priority.   
Third, not only did the wife reserve rights over a portion of her own property through 
the law of the marriage portion.  Upon marriage, she also gained rights over a portion of 
her husband’s property through the law of dower (douaire).  Dower was a form of built-in 
insurance designed to provide for the wife upon her husband’s death.  If the wife became 
a widow, she would be entitled to one-third to one-half of all the movable property (not 
the land or immovable property) owned by her husband during the marriage.  This was 
not just the movable property that the husband brought into the marriage or left at his 
death.  Dower rights attached as well to any movable property that the husband acquired 
during the marriage – including, importantly, the movable property in his inheritance from 
his own family.  The cumulative value of all that movable property was calculated on the 
husband’s death, and the widow assigned her dower property.  Typically the widow 
received a life estate or usufruct in this property – the right to use and possess the dower 
property for her lifetime, but with no right to sell or dispose of the property.  This dower 
property would revert to the couple’s children upon her death, or, in the absence of 
children, to her late husband’s family.  If the widow sold or gave away her dower property 
to third parties or damaged or destroyed it during her life estate, her children or her late 
husband’s family could bring suits for its restitution when their reversionary interests 
vested.  
Dower rights imposed an ample restriction on the husband’s rights to dispose of 





encumber, or give away his movable property without consideration of his wife’s dower 
interests.  Nor could he craft his last will and testament without taking these dower 
interests into account. For, after his death, his wife and the children could claim their 
dower rights against third parties who had acquired interests in the late husband’s 
property without the wife’s consent or without advance payment to her.  Moreover, in 
cases where a husband had squandered or misused all his movable property, or where 
he sought to give his entire estate to others, the wife could make priority claims on the 
balance of her husband’s estate to have her dower interests made whole.  
While betrothed parties could negotiate about the types and amounts of property 
subject to dower, they could not renounce dower altogether.  “To allow a woman to 
contract herself out of her [dower] rights would put her rights at the mercy of the 
unscrupulous.”29  The canon law, in particular, made dower mandatory, and punished 
severely unscrupulous husbands who sought to avoid its effects through fancy property 
schemes.  Only if the wife were convicted for adultery or malicious desertion of her 
husband would she forfeit her dower.30  
A good illustration of this law of marital property can be seen in a 1536 marriage 
and marital property contract between a woman named Claude Bigot and the 
distinguished Genevan jurist Germain Colladon, who would later join Calvin in the 
leadership of the Genevan Reformation (Doc. 1).  Germain Colladon was a well-heeled 
soul, son of an attorney and nephew of a judge in the nearby French city of Bourges.  
Bigot had lost her parents while still a youth, but she had inherited a good deal of money 
and property that was being held in trust by her grandmother.  The grandmother was also 
Claude’s guardian.  She was, evidently, a rather skilled negotiator, given the quite 
generous marital property agreement she struck for Claude.  
The marital property contract was executed after the parties had executed their 
formal betrothal to marry.  The agreement confirms that Germain and Claude promise to 
be married in the future (art. 2).  Both their families give their consent to the pending union 
(art. 3) and become parties to the marital property agreement.  But the economics of the 
marriage are the principal concern of the instrument.  Claude, the future wife, promises 
to bring to the marriage an ample dowry of 1500 livres, comprised of land, movables, and 
a yearly income drawn from Claude’s inheritance.  As a way of protecting themselves, 
Claude and her guardian grandmother agree to make the dowry payments in installments 
over two years, future payments presumably to be withheld if the marriage goes amiss or 
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is annulled after the wedding.  They also promise to furnish Claude’s own clothing and 
ornaments (arts. 4, 5).  They even promise substitute dowry payments if the projected 
yearly income from one of the dowry properties falls short (art. 11).  One-third of this 
dowry (500 livres) is stipulated to become community property of the marriage, for the 
common use of husband and wife, which either party takes upon the death of the other.  
Two-thirds of this dowry (1000 livres) is reserved as Claude’s marriage portion (arts. 5, 
6).    
If Claude predeceases him, Germain, her future husband, promises to turn over to 
Claude’s heirs this 1000 livres marriage portion, along with Claude’s rings, clothing, and 
personal effects (art. 8).  If Germain predeceases her and the couple has no children, 
Claude receives not only her 1000 livres marriage portion, but also her 500 livres 
contribution to the community property.  Presumably, if there are children, the 500 livres 
goes to them.  Moreover, Germain promises Claude a dower of one-half of his movable 
property of her choice, plus a stipulated monetary inheritance beyond this standard dower 
(arts. 7, 9).  Germain’s father also makes a gift of land to his son, in consideration of the 
marriage (art. 10).  The ius commune would give Claude no rights over her husband’s 
immovable property, and nothing in what survives of the contract changes that 
presumption.  
Much of this traditional law and custom of marital property was unchanged by the 
Reformation in Geneva.  Calvin may have written, or at least intended to write, more on 
the subject of marital property than has survived.  The outline of his proposed Code of 
Civil Law and Civil Procedure for Geneva includes titles for separate entries on dower, 
dowry, and usufruct, as well as detailed titles on testamentary succession, which also 
would have dealt with the dower rights of widows.31  It is unclear whether Calvin wrote 
these provisions in his proposed code; if he did, they have not survived.  What has 
survived is a fragment of Calvin’s proposed statute on the division of marital property in 
the event of a couple’s formal separation (Doc.  2).   But this fragment does not address 
the thorny question of dowry and marriage portion rights that a separation case would 
raise.  
No other new statute on marital property was forged in Calvin’s day.  But, in 1568, 
four years after Calvin’s death, the same Germain Colladon whom we encountered above 
prepared a lengthy new title on point for the new Civil Code of Geneva (Doc. 3).   This 
was a sophisticated and comprehensive new code that remained in effect until the 
republican government of Geneva collapsed in 1792, as a by-product of the French 
Revolution.   
 
 





The marital property provisions in the 1568 Civil Code largely repeated the 
traditional law of dowry that we have seen.  It made one change that was potentially 
advantageous to women.  The full amount of the dowry that the woman brought to the 
marriage was now presumptively her marriage portion, unless the parties stipulated 
otherwise.  Her husband could use that property during their married life, but she was 
entitled to full recovery of all of it (arts. 3, 4, 6, 13) upon his death, as well as any accrued 
increase in its value (art. 5).  Traditionally, a wife’s marriage portion was on the order of 
a third or a half of the dowry.   
The new marital property law also largely repeated the traditional law of dower.  
But it made two changes, both potentially harmful to widows.  First, unless they could 
prove that their husbands had deliberately sought to defraud them, widows received no 
priority over other creditors in securing their dower interests from their late husband’s 
estate if (art. 17).  This could well leave a widow with nothing, if her husband had been 
incompetent in managing his property or died heavily in debt.  Second, a husband could 
order his heirs to support his widow upon his death.  If she accepted their support, the 
widow would forfeit her dower interest and its accrued value.  This provision could well 
expose widows to the designs of unscrupulous heirs.  It was a notable departure from the 
canon law rule that a woman’s dower rights could not be renounced under any condition, 
save her conviction for adultery or malicious desertion.  
Not every marriage contract required the kind of detail that was set out in the 1568 
Civil Code of Geneva.  But the statute did seem to encourage Genevan parties to get 
their marital affairs in written order.  Perhaps this reality dawned on a Genevan couple 
Michel Guichon and Pernette Cuvat.  For, in 1569, the year after the statute came into 
effect, the parties executed a simple marital contract to formalize a marriage they had 
already celebrated and consummated (Doc. 4).  This was, evidently, a couple of modest 
means, and they agreed simply to merge their respective properties with full mutual rights 
of survivorship.  In the event of children, however, Pernette would receive her stipulated 
marriage portion and then serve as trustee of the balance of the marital property, using it 
to support the children.  All this was in perfect accord with the 1568 law. 
Conditional Betrothal and Marriage Contracts  
While much of the law of marital property in Geneva continued largely unchanged 
during the Reformation, the reformers did make a significant change in the law governing 






Conditional marriage contracts had become a rather complex topic by the early 
sixteenth century.32  Late medieval canonists and Church courts regularly faced the 
question of what to do when a party contracted thus: I shall marry you “if my parents 
agree”; “after you have secured a job”; “provided you quit your military service”; “so long 
as the wedding takes place within six months”; “if we can live in my hometown”; “provided 
you pay me certain property”; “after my father dies”; “if God preserves me”; “so long as 
we have no children”; “if you can touch the sky”; “whenever a woman becomes pope”; “if 
you can drink the sea empty”; “provided you kill my rival” or any number of other such 
conditions.  Did those promises automatically lapse if the condition was not met, or would 
the parties have to litigate?  What if the conditions in question were impossible, silly, or 
downright illegal?  
By the eve of the Reformation, the canonists had gathered a complex 
jurisprudence around these questions.33  They herded conditional promises into a whole 
complex of categories.  Three categories of conditions were the most important and 
common.  “Honest possible” conditions (“if my parents consent,” “so long as you move to 
Geneva by September 1” “provided you buy me a horse and carriage before the wedding”) 
were valid, and betrothal or marriage promises could be voided on their breach.  
“Dishonest possible” conditions that vitiated an essential dimension of marriage (“so long 
as we have no children”; “provided I may maintain a concubine”; “so long as you remain 
unbaptized”) were invalid, and automatically voided the promises.  All other conditions 
were generally disregarded and the promises enforced as if the condition had not been 
made.  These included “dishonest possible” conditions that did not go to the essence of 
the marriage (“so long as you kill my rival”) as well as conditions that were naturally or 
legally impossible (“if you empty the sea”; “when a woman becomes pope”).34  
Calvin and his colleagues continued a good bit of the traditional law of conditions 
– though they simplified it considerably and explicitly outlawed the use of property 
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conditions.  The 1546 Marriage Ordinance had three provisions on conditional promises.  
Item 6 recognized that betrothal promises could be made “conditionally or otherwise.”  
Item 14 made quite clear that property conditions would not be enforced: “Failure to pay 
a dowry or money or provide an outfit shall not prevent the marriage from coming into full 
effect, since these are only accessory.”  Item 15 was more ambiguous:  
Although in discussing or arranging a marriage it is lawful to 
add conditions or reserve someone’s consent, nevertheless 
when it comes to making the promise let it be pure and simple, 
and let a statement made conditionally not be regarded as a 
promise of marriage. 
 
Read together with items 6 and 14, item 15 seems to say that betrothal contracts 
(those made “in discussing or arranging a marriage”) could have non-property conditions 
attached to them, but marriage contracts had to be unconditional.  This was, in fact, how 
the Genevan authorities read and applied the 1546 Marriage Ordinance.  Parties could 
seek annulment of betrothal contracts only, not marriage contracts, on grounds of breach 
of condition.  Those conditions, however, not only had to be “honest and possible” but 
had to go the essence of the budding marriage contract.  Property or dowry payments 
were not considered essential conditions, and the Consistory disregarded them and 
enforced these betrothal contracts even if the parties had failed to deliver their promised 
property. 
A good example of a valid conditional betrothal contract was the 1547 contract 
signed by a former Genevan named Helias who was now living in a nearby town of 
Neuchâtel (Doc. 5).   No doubt instructed by counsel, Helias’s fiancée had conditioned 
her marriage to him on proof that he was “not bound by any other marriage bond.”  The 
Neuchâtel authorities wanted to know from their Genevan counterparts whether Helias 
was already party to any betrothal or marriage contract.  This condition did go to the 
essence of marriage, namely, whether Helias was in fact free to contract a new marriage.  
Calvin and his colleagues respected this condition.  They certified to their Neuchâtel 
colleagues that Helias was not married or betrothed and was thus free to marry.  
Another valid condition was for parties to accept betrothal proposals conditioned 
on the approval of their parents or guardians.  The Genevan authorities usually respected 
these conditional betrothals, and annulled them when parental consent was not 
forthcoming.  For parental consent, like individual consent, did go to the essence of the 
marriage, particularly if the party stipulating the condition was a minor.  Indeed in contracts 
involving minors (males under 20, females under 18), parental consent was as essential 
to the validity of the marriage as the consent of the couple.   
In a 1552 case, for example, Pierre Sautier proposed to Rolanda in the presence 





conditioned upon her parents’ consent to the marriage.  When her parents did not 
consent, Rolanda returned the ring to Pierre, who promptly became betrothed to another 
woman.  When he was accused of bigamy, Pierre defended himself by saying that the 
first betrothal contract was automatically voided by the breach of the condition of parental 
consent.  The authorities agreed. Similarly in a 1556 case, a young woman named 
Guigonne conditioned her consent to Hugo Cant’s proposal on the consent of her parents 
(Doc. 7).  The parents dissented, and Guigonne petitioned the Consistory to annul her 
betrothal.  Although her parents were Catholics (whose views were not much respected 
in Geneva), and Guigonne gave only hearsay testimony of their dissent, the Consistory 
respected this breach of condition, and declared the betrothal contract “void and 
fraudulent.”35 
Contrast the conditions in these cases with the condition that new émigrés to 
Geneva frequently asked the Consistory to enforce: “I shall marry you, provided you move 
to Geneva with me.”  This was the issue in a 1554 case of Jean Philippe and Anne Renaud 
(Doc. 8).  The Consistory did not respect this condition, and upheld the betrothal contract 
of Jean and Anne. Their principal rationale was that the stipulated condition was a matter 
ancillary to the essence of marriage.  Where a married couple would live after their 
wedding was hardly relevant to the core question whether they were fit, competent, and 
eligible to give their mutual consent to marriage.  Jean and Anne had given their free and 
full consent, and they would have to proceed with their marriage, even if they ultimately 
lived elsewhere.  
The Consistory dealt similarly with betrothal contracts that included property 
conditions.  Already in a 1545 case, for example, the Consistory summoned Louis Piaget 
and his fiancée to inquire why they had not married (Doc. 9).  It turned out that Louis was 
awaiting payment of a rather handsome dowry by his fiancée’s master, and his fiancée 
had meanwhile returned to live with her father.  The Consistory inquired closely whether 
the only issue was over property.  When that proved to be the only obstacle, the 
Consistory ordered the couple to get married, and sent the fiancée’s master to the Council 
who ordered him to pay the promised dowry.  
The Consistory ruled similarly in two cases the following year.  Jean de Landécy 
and Mia had become properly betrothed before witnesses (Doc. 10).  Mia had promised 
Jean a dowry of money to be paid in installments.  But, because she had not been able 
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to collect money owed to her, Mia had substituted various household items and tools for 
her first dowry installment.  Jean had accepted the goods, but evidently wanted his dowry 
money as well and threatened to break off the betrothal.  Mia promised to try to fulfill her 
dowry demands. That was good enough for the Consistory to remand the case to the 
Council, with a recommendation that marriage be required.  The Council ordered the 
couple to marry.  
Similarly Nicolard Adduard and Jehanne had been properly betrothed before 
witnesses. (Doc. 11).  Jehanne’s uncle had made an unconditional promise of supplying 
a dowry of money, cattle, and all their household goods.  When the uncle failed to deliver, 
Jehanne argued that she had been swindled, and wished neither to marry nor to furnish 
substitute dowry.  Nicolard wanted to marry only if he could get his hands on the promised 
dowry.   The parties fell into bitter dispute and pled to be released from their betrothal. 
The Consistory would hear nothing of breaking the betrothals over a dowry dispute.  They 
sent the parties to the Council.  The Council ordered them to marry, notwithstanding 
Jehanne’s continued protests.   
The 1552-3 case of Thomas Bonna and Claudine Loelmoz illustrates that a man 
could not condition his consent to marriage upon full and exact satisfaction of the dowry 
promise (Doc. 12).  Thomas betrothed Claudine and gave her a golden ring.  He 
conditioned his promise, however, on her delivery of a cash dowry – not land, goods, or 
other property.  Claudine brought several chests of wine, and other property.  Thomas 
accepted them, but continued to insist on the promised cash dowry.  When that was not 
forthcoming, he sought to annul the betrothal.  The Consistory would hear none of it.  The 
betrothal promise and the dowry promise were separate agreements, the Consistory 
insisted.  Breach of the dowry promise could not be used as a ground for dissolving the 
betrothal, particularly if a man tendered a betrothal gift as Thomas had done.  The case, 
which bounced back and forth between the Consistory and Council for more than a year, 
was an important precedent.  Had Bonna prevailed, it would have been easy enough for 
a man, or his father, to demand perfect tender of a dowry before giving his consent to the 
marriage.  This would defeat the principle on which Calvin had insisted – that questions 
of marital property were to remain ancillary to questions of the validity of the betrothal and 
marriage contract itself.   
Summary and Conclusions 
In Calvin’s Geneva, as much as today, marriage was a contract between a fit man 
and a fit woman of the age of consent.  Marriage was much more than a contract.  It was 
also a spiritual, social, natural, and economic unit that could involve many other parties 
besides the couple.  But marriage was never less than a contract.  It could not be created 
unless both the man and the woman consented voluntarily to this union.  
Calvin and his colleagues took pains to ensure the free and full consent of both 





marriage promises be made “simply” and “honorably,” without “trick” or “surprise.”  The 
Consistory annulled engagement and marriage contracts procured by physical force or 
threat of force, or through fraud, deception, or seduction.  They also annulled frivolous 
and drunken promises.  The Consistory respected conditions to engagement contracts 
that went to the essence of marriage – such as conditioning one’s own consent on the 
consent of one’s parents.  But they had no patience with other conditions about ancillary 
matters – such as conditioning one’s consent on the other’s delivery of marital property.  
These conditional engagement contracts were enforced regardless of whether the 
ancillary condition had been breached – and regardless of whether this breach now put 
the couple at such odds that they both wanted out. The mutual consent of the parties was 
essential to form the engagement contract; but, once properly formed, the engagement 
contract could not dissolved even by mutual consent. 
The wedding liturgy was the final essential step in the validation of marriage in 
Calvin’s Geneva.  It represented the community’s consent to the marriage, as expressed 
by their magistrates and ministers.  Magistrates voiced their consent through the signing 
and validation of the banns and the registration of the new couple’s marriage contract and 
marital property.  Ministers voiced their consent through the announcement of the banns 
and the celebration of the wedding liturgy.   
Calvin took banns and weddings as seriously as he had taken the earlier stages 
of marriage formation.  For him, wedding preparations and celebrations were solemn 
steps in the final divine confirmation and validation of a marriage.  These final steps of 
marriage could not be rushed.  Parties would have to start over if they failed to announce 
their banns or celebrate their weddings properly.  These final steps of marriage could also 
not be ruined by subsequent drunkenness, dancing or debauchery at the wedding party.  
This insulted the marital vows that the couple had just taken to be moral exemplars to 
each other and the community. 
Calvin also took seriously the need for a delay between betrothals and weddings.  
The point of a public betrothal and waiting period was to invite others to weigh in on the 
maturity and compatibility of the couple, to offer them counsel and commodities, and to 
prepare for the celebration of their union and their life together thereafter.  And it was to 
prepare their families and congregations to give their solemn consent to this budding new 
union.  Too long a betrothal would encourage the couple to fornication.  But too short a 
betrothal would discourage them from introspection.  Too secret a wedding would deprive 
couples of the essential counsel and commodities of their families and friends.  But too 
open a wedding would deprive couples of the consent and confirmation of the community 
that counted.  Too solemn a wedding ceremony would smother the joy that a new marital 
love should bring.  But too raucous a wedding party would trespass the duties that the 
new marriages had just brought.  Calvin thus strove to strike a judicious balance between 






These reforms of marriage contracts, ceremonies, and settlements were part and 
product of a much larger transformation of the theology and law of marriage in sixteenth-
century Geneva and well beyond.  Building on a generation of Protestant reforms, Calvin 
constructed a comprehensive new theology and jurisprudence that made marital 
formation and dissolution, children’s nurture and welfare, family cohesion and support, 
and sexual sin and crime essential concerns for both church and state.  Working with 
other jurists and theologians, Calvin drew the Consistory and Council of Geneva into a 
creative new alliance to govern domestic and sexual subjects.  Together, these authorities 
outlawed monasticism and mandatory clerical celibacy, and encouraged marriage for all 
fit adults.  They set clear guidelines for courtship and engagement.  They mandated 
parental consent, peer witness, church consecration, and state registration for valid 
marriage.  They radically reconfigured weddings and wedding feasts.  They reformed 
marital property and inheritance, marital consent and impediments.  They created new 
rights and duties for wives within the bedroom and for children within the household.  They 
streamlined the grounds and procedures for annulment.  They introduced fault-based 
divorce for both husbands and wives on grounds of adultery and desertion.  They 
encouraged the remarriage of divorcées and widow(er)s.  They punished rape, 
fornication, prostitution, sodomy, and other sexual felonies with startling new severity.  
They put firm new restrictions on dancing, sumptuousness, ribaldry, and obscenity.  They 
put new stock in catechesis and education, and created new schools, curricula, and 
teaching aids.  They provided new sanctuary to illegitimate, abandoned, and abused 
children.  They created new protections for abused wives and impoverished widows.  
Many of these reforms of sixteenth-century Geneva were echoed and elaborated in 
numerous Calvinist communities, on both sides of the Atlantic, and a good number of 
these reforms found their way into our modern civil law and common law of domestic 
relations. 
What made this Calvinist reformation of sex, marriage, and family life so resolute 
and resilient was that it was a top-to-bottom reformulation of ideas and institutions, 
theology and law, learning and living.  Calvin set out his legal reforms in scores of new 
statutes and consilia that were applied and adapted in hundreds of cases that came 
before the Genevan authorities.  He set out his theological reforms in hundreds of 
sermons, commentaries, and systematic writings that were echoed and elaborated by a 
whole army of Reformed preachers and theologians in succeeding decades, ultimately 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  He set out his pastoral advice in literally thousands of letters 
and pamphlets that ultimately catalyzed a whole industry of Protestant household 
manuals – the spiritual Dr. Spocks of their day -- that would continue to be produced in 








Marriage Contract of Germain Colladon and Claude Bigot (1536)36 
1. Master Germain Colladon37 the younger, attorney at law, of the one part, and 
the respectable Claude Bigot, daughter of the late honorable, respectable, and august 
Master Nicolas Bigot, during his lifetime counselor of our lord the king and lieutenant-
general of the baliff of Berry, and of the respectable Cathérine Charrier his wife ... by the 
respectable Guymon Thévernin, widow of the late Ythier Charrier, her maternal 
grandmother, for her of the other part. 
2. Which parties have stated that a marriage by words de futuro has been agreed 
to between the said Master Germain Colladon and the said Claude Bigot according to the 
agreements, articles, and decisions which follow, by which the said Colladon, by the 
advice, counsel, and judgment of the honorable, respectable, and august Masters 
Germain Colladon, judge and warden of La Chastre, his father, Léon Colladon, attorney, 
counselor, and barrister of Bourges, his brother, [and] Urbain Chauveton, his brother-in-
law ... has promised to take the said Claude Bigot as wife and spouse. 
3. Likewise the said Claude Bigot by the will ... counsel of the said Guymon 
Thévenin, her said grandmother, and by the advice of the prudent and respectable Robert 
Bigot, paternal uncle of the said Claude, and of the honorable, respectable, and august 
Master Léon Colladon, Jean Artuys, [and] Jean Deschamps, brothers-in-law of the said 
Claude, has promised to take the said Master Germain Colladon as husband and spouse, 
if God, etc. 
4. And in favor and expectation of the said marriage the said Guymon Thévenin, 
the aforesaid grandmother, having the administration of the bodies and goods of Masters 
Nicolas and Pierre Bigot..., of Etienne and Madeleine Bigot, and of the said Claude, all 
minor children of the said late Master Nicolas Bigot and the late Cathérine Charrier, has 
promised and promises to pay and give to the said future spouses from the goods fallen 
in by succession from the said deceased and which are common to the said minor 
children the sum of 1500 livres tournois, and this to cover all rights falling and payable to 
the said Claude by the said succession from the said deceased, that is: 
 
 
36 Original in Bourges, Arch. dép. E4453 (Minutes of the notary Jean Ragueau), ancien: 4453, reprinted in 
Erich-Hans Kaden, Le Jurisconsulte Germain Colladon ami de Jean Calvin et de Théodore de Bèze 
(Geneva, 1974), 141-143.  The ellipses and fragments are per the reprinted text.  





(a) For the sum of 300 livres tournois, a house as it stands, situated in this city of 
Bourges on the rue d’Oron next to.... 
(b) Also for the sum of 200 livres, the sum of 13 livres tournois of rents.... 
(c) Also for the sum of 260 livres tournois, a body of land in several parcels situated 
near this city of Bourges, acquired by the said late Master Nicolas Bigot from the widow 
of the late Bélin. 
(d) Also the sum of 140 livres tournois in movables. 
(e) Also the sum of 600 livres tournois in cash, the sum of 400 livres on the day of 
the nuptial blessing by the said Guymon Thévenin, the aforesaid grandmother, and the 
sum of 200 livres tournois within two years, counting from the day and date of the present 
act. 
(f) And the said widow shall clothe ... the said Claude with wedding clothes and 
garments well and properly according to her estate, by the judgment and decision of 
herself and of the other relatives and friends of the said Claude. 
5. And it was stated and agreed that of the said sum of 1500 livres tournois, the 
sum of 1000 shall be accounted a personal inheritance for the said future wife ... and the 
sum of 500 livres tournois shall be accounted movables.  And this ... the goods, movables, 
and acquisitions ... that they gain and acquire during the said marriage are and shall 
remain common to the said future spouses. 
6. Also it was agreed between the said parties that if the said future wife should 
happen to pass from life to death before the said future husband without legitimate 
descendants of the said marriage, the said future husband shall be required to render to 
the heirs of the said future wife the said sum of 1000 livres tournois accounted as an 
inheritance, or the inheritance which shall have been acquired with the said sum, and the 
common goods of ... and the said sum of 500 livres accounted as movables or that which 
... shall have been ... without the said heirs of the said Claude being able to claim any 
common right in the goods and joint estate of the said future husband. 
7. Also if it happens that the said future husband passes from life to death before 
the said future wife without or with legitimate descendants of the said marriage, she shall 
have a right of choice and election of her common property from the goods, movables, 
and acquisitions of the said future husband along with the heirs of the said future husband, 
and in so choosing the said common goods, she shall take and have the sum of 500 livres 
only for her said inheritance and half of the movables and acquisitions, and in case she 





property, she shall have for an inheritance the said sum of 1000 livres tournois, and if ... 
and the said 500 livres accounted as movables and the said.... 
8. And whatever goods she chooses, she shall have in addition her jewelry and 
her ... in whatever amount they may be and the dower ... as a stipulated addition, and 
shall have time and space for making the said choice of three months, counted from ... of 
the said husband, during which time she shall live off the community goods without ... of 
her said choice. 
9. And whichever choice she makes, the said future husband ... one or the other,38 
in case there are children of the said marriage, of the sum of 30 livres tournois of rents 
only for the life of the said Claude, or the sum of 300 livres paid all at once, and in case 
there are no children of the said marriage, one or other of the said sum of 30 livres tournois 
of rents during her life or the sum of ... 400 livres tournois paid all at once, at the choice 
and election of the said Claude Bigot. 
10. And also the said Master Germain Colladon ... in favor of the said marriage 
both gives and gives by act ... by pure and simple and irrevocable gift ... solemnly inter 
vivos to the said Master Germain Colladon, his said son, ... and he accepts a meadow ... 
located and situated in ... [the] outskirts of La Chastre next to the road ... going from ... 
from the said town to Nevers ... next to the meadow of Germain B ... next to the vineyard 
of Simon and ... and this as a marriage gift,39 and also ... to the said Master Germain 
Colladon and to his future ... of the said Master Germain ... of the said meadow.... 
11. Also it was further stated and agreed that in case it is found that the rent of the 
said Orron house and for the said ... and the said body of land in La Chastre do not come 
to the sums aforesaid at which they have been rated, in the said case the said widow ... 
pay to the said future husband the sums and ... at which they have been estimated and 
rated within three years, or the lowest value ... the said Claude shall promise to return in 
dividing with her said brothers and sisters ... the aforesaid goods or that which ... shall be. 
12. ....pledged ... of the august Senate and given at Bourges the twenty-fifth day 
of the month of June of the year 1536 before the respectable Jean Ragueau ... merchant 
residing in Bourges and the prudent and respectable François Deschamps, residing...to 
the witnesses summoned. 
 
 
38 The French phrase is “douche et douche.”  
39 The French word is “préciput,” meaning in this case a sum given at marriage, without prejudicing his right 





                                  Ragueau 
Document 2 
Fragment of Calvin’s Draft Ordinance on Matrimonial Property (n.d.)40 
Moreover, because otherwise we could not bring them to an agreement, we have 
ordered and order that beforehand and ahead of everything they must make an inventory 
both of their merchandise and of the business they do, debts, bonds, and everything else 
depending on it, and of their movables, utensils, common possessions, and purchased 
property.  Let them settle and close their accounts and so arrange between them that 
there is a definite resolution, to put an end to all previous quarrels, and so that from this 
time on each may know what is his, so that there may be no retraction. 
And we desire this to be done as soon as possible, at the latest within a year, 
without formal proceedings, but peaceably and with goodwill.  If it happens that one of the 
parties does not want to consent to this – that is, to making such an inventory and settling 
their accounts without a suit or going to court – the other shall have the option and liberty 
of renouncing the present agreement and returning to his first course [of legal action?]. 
This being done, it shall be our desire that the two parties live together, keeping a 
common household as they have done until now, both for their own contentment and 
repose and to avoid the gossip of the world and the scandal that might result from their 
separation. 
Nevertheless, since we cannot get them to agree to this, we order41 that the 
separation be carried out when the accounts are finished, that is within a year.  So that 
they must separate and each withdraw himself peaceably,42 under penalty of returning to 
their previous condition, that is that each respectively should continue in the rights and 
actions he had taken as though this present agreement had never been made. 
Nevertheless, if it happens afterwards that for the ease and convenience of the 
two parties or of one of them it seems proper to them to arrange and carry out a 
separation, we leave them at liberty to do this. 
 
 
40 CO 10/1:143-144. 
41 Calvin first wrote: “Nevertheless, if it cannot be done otherwise and both the parties prefer to live 
separately, or one of the two desires this, we order...” 






Civil Edicts (January 29, 1568)43 
 
Title XIV 
Marriages, Dowries, Dowers, and Accrual44 
1. The age, authority, and consent required for marriage are stated in the 
Ecclesiastical Ordinances [of 1561]. 
2. Guardians or trustees may not establish contracts or promises to marry between 
themselves or their relatives and those under their authority during the period of their 
authority and until they have surrendered their accounts and the residue of their trust; 
after having done so, they may not contract or make promises [of marriage] without the 
relatives’ consent. 
3. If there is no express provision of a dowry, conveyed and granted at the 
marriage, all of the wife’s property will be deemed assigned and constituted as the dowry, 
and the husband will have its use and usufruct during the marriage to defray costs.  And 
the husband must make an inventory of the property and give his wife proper 
acknowledgment of it, to serve her and hers in case of restitution. 
4. The dowry provided, of whatever it consists and from whomever it derives, is 
assigned to the wife as her property to dispose of and devise to her heirs, unless there is 
a contrary agreement and exception in the contract establishing it.  
5. The law of increase [addendum] and accrual is that, unless it is otherwise 
agreed, half of the value of the dower45 will be given to the wife from her husband’s assets 
as a life estate, she giving warranty that after her death the capital will be returned to be 
preserved for the children of the marriage, if there are any; otherwise it will belong entirely 
to her. 
6. And if the dowry does not consist of money but of real property or other goods 
rather than money, the value of the goods will be appraised by knowledgeable people to 
 
 
43 SD, vol. 3, item  no. 1081.  
44 The French word for dower is douaire, meaning a wife (and widow’s) life interest in a portion of her (late) 
husband’s property. The French word for dowry is dot, meaning the property that a woman brings into a 
marriage or sometimes receives at the time of marriage from her family.  While the statute’s title makes this 
linguistic distinction, the text throughout uses only the term dot/dottes.  Where it is obvious, that the text is 
referring to “dower,” rather than “dowry,” we have translated dot as dower. 
45 Here is an instance where dot seems to mean dower, not dowry.  Item 4 had just indicated that the dowry 
(dot) is the wife’s property to be disposed of at her will.  Item 5 says that the dower (dot), however, is only 





establish and assess the said accrual at the rate of one-third of the value of the goods 
which the husband will have had the use of because of his wife. 
7. If a daughter married by her father has some property from her mother’s side, 
and when providing the dowry her father does not state from whose property it is derived, 
the dowry will be presumed to come from the father’s property, and her maternal property 
will be preserved to her. 
8. And if a mother or grandmother, having authority over her daughter, provides a 
dowry on her marriage without declaring from whose property it derives, the said provision 
will be imputed to her paternal property; and if this does not suffice, the remainder of the 
dowry will be taken from the property of the mother or grandmother. 
9. Those joined in marriage may not convey to each other during their lifetimes, at 
death, or by will more than half of their property derived from their parents to the prejudice 
of their parents in direct line or their brothers and sisters in collateral line.  But they may 
dispose at will of the property they have acquired [during the marriage]. 
10. And if they have children they may not convey or devise to each other’s benefit 
more than the usufruct of a third of their property.  But the husband may leave to his wife 
the entire usufruct of all his property for the purpose of supporting his children, and this 
usufruct will last until the children reach the age of majority or marry. 
11. Someone who marries a second time, having children by a previous marriage, 
may not convey property to his or her spouse for the said marriage or during it in excess 
of the portion of that one of his or her said other children to whom the least has been 
given. 
12. What has been conveyed from one of those joined in marriage to the other 
whether by contract, will, or other disposition will revert to the children of the said marriage 
after the donee’s death, even if the donation included the power to dispose of it at the 
donee’s wish. 
13. If a wife survives her husband she will have and retain the dresses, rings, and 
jewelry that she brought to her husband [at the marriage], to dispose of at her pleasure.  
As for dresses, rings, and jewelry that she received from her husband before or during 
the marriage, these, like her accrual, will be subject to restitution to the children, unless it 
has been stated otherwise in the marriage contract or the will. 
14. But if the wife dies before her husband her heirs may demand of her husband 
only the dresses, rings, and jewelry found to be those that she brought to him on 





15. A wife convicted of adultery will lose her dowry46, and the said dowry will be 
given to her husband unless she has children by a previous marriage, in which case these 
children will receive only their own reserved portions.47 
16. A widow, if she fornicates, will lose and render the accrued value of her dower 
to her husband’s heirs.  And if she was one of his heirs she will lose her inheritance to 
the designated substitute, or in default of such, to her husband’s closest relatives. 
17. Women owed dowers will not be preferred to creditors who hold previous 
bonds or mortgages, except for property that was expressly acquired using the dower 
money and without fraud.  
18. If a wife, after the death of her husband, carries away or hides any goods 
belonging to her said husband, on being duly convicted of this she will be required to 
make restitution of three times the value of the goods taken, with deprivation of her 
accrual and of other goods given to her by her husband. 
19. If a husband, by will or otherwise, has ordered that his wife be supported by 
his heirs during her widowhood, if she wishes to accept this provision, then during that 
time she may not recover either her dower?48 or its accrued value. 
20. If a husband sells some of his wife’s real property, even with her consent, she 
will be recompensed with the price set on it from her husband’s property, unless the said 
amount has been used for her or for other purchases for her benefit. 
21. If a husband has purchased property in his wife’s name during their marriage 
she may not retain the said property unless she pays over its price or proves that it was 
purchased with her money. 
 
 
46 It is a closer question whether dot here means dower or dowry.  It was commonplace of the ius commune 
that a wife sacrifices her dower interest if convicted of adultery.  But normally only the children of the present 
marriage, not her prior marriage, would inherit her dower interests.  Thus it could well be that the statute is 
referring to her dowry (which all her legitimate children, by whatever marriage) would inherit.  
47 The reserved portion (légitime in French) was the amount of an estate required to be left to a child or 
other natural heir, regardless of the amount willed elsewhere. 
48 Here it is not clear whether dot meant dowry or dower.    It was not uncommon in the day to calculate not 
only the original value of the dowry, but also its accrued or increase value, which was called the addendum.  
See J.F. Poudret, “La situation du conjoint survivant en pays de Vaud XIIIe-XVIe siècle,” Mémories de la 






Marriage Contract of Michel Guichon and Pernette Cuvat (1569)49 
Let it be known and manifest to all that a marriage was recently contracted and 
duly solemnized and carried out in the Christian church of this city between the Honorable 
Michel, son of the late François Guichon, of Mésigny, boatman, resident of Geneva on 
one part, and Pernette, daughter of the late Egrege Claude Cuvat of Geneva on the other 
part, without anything concerning the said marriage having been reduced to writing, as 
the parties state.   
Now today, the fourth of the month of April, 1569, before me, the undersigned 
notary public, and the witnesses named below, there appeared personally the aforesaid 
Michel Guichon and Pernette Cuvat, his wife.  The parties, in consideration of this 
marriage and following the agreement made when it was contracted, of their own free 
will, for themselves and all their heirs, have taken and take each other, for whatever goods 
they have at present or may have afterwards, whether movable, immovable, gold, silver, 
deeds, titles, or claims of any sort, so that the survivor will be and remain the sole and 
exclusive heir of the first decedent.   
If, however, it pleases God to give them children by the present marriage, the wife 
after the death of her husband will take and receive from all the property of Guichon her 
husband the sum of fifty florins in all, together with the furnished bed she has brought to 
Guichon and all clothing, rings, and jewels and all movables she has brought to him, 
which are here taken to be specified.  Guichon consents and is content that Pernette his 
wife will then act with a good and healthy conscience to manage and dispose of the whole 
[marital property] at her good pleasure and will.   
So the said parties have promised and sworn by an oath taken before me, the 
undersigned notary, having agreed to keep good, firm, and valid the present act and to 
preserve, observe, and inviolably accomplish all its contents without ever contradicting or 
contravening it in any way or manner whatever.  For this purpose, they have pledged and 
expressly hypothecated all their goods whatever, movable and immovable, present and 
future, which, for the complete observation of the present contract, they have submitted 
and submit to all the course and rigor of the law where they are found, renouncing all 
rules, laws, statutes, edicts, and privileges by which they might aid and serve themselves 
to contradict what is written above, notably the rule that says that a general renunciation 
is not valid if a specific one does not precede it.  For which purpose the said parties have 
indeed asked that each of them be provided a contract made publicly according to the 
advice and correction of knowledgeable people, without changing its substance.   
 
 





Concluded and enacted in Geneva in the house of the couple Claude Tosspot and 
Jean Bonnex, boatmen, citizens of Geneva, Jean Samoen, cobbler, and Jacques 
Marquis, also a cobbler, both residents of Geneva, being present as the required 
witnesses, and I, Aymé Santeur, the undersigned notary.  
         Santeur 
Document 5 
Letter of Attestation to Neuchâtel (1547)50 
To the faithful servants and pastors of Christ in the church at Neuchâtel, both in 
the city and in the country, our beloved brethren and colleagues: Because our brother 
Helias who dwells among you wrote that a woman had betrothed herself to him on 
condition that, before the marriage was solemnized, he should certify to you by proper 
testimonies that he was not bound by any other marriage bond, at his request we 
appointed two from our college to inquire into this matter.  After investigation, they 
reported to us as follows: that six men and one woman of acknowledged repute declared 
with one voice that Helias was known to them in La Rochelle when he was a priest in the 
church first of St. Nicholas and afterwards of St. Bartholomew, that he lived honorably 
among men without any whisper of fornication, that he never publicly had a wife there, 
and that there was never any rumor of a private or secret marriage known to them.  
Accordingly, they hold him to be a man free from any marriage tie.  We wished this to be 
testified to you lest we should fail in our duty to our brother.   
 
Document 6 
Case of Pierre Sautier (1552)51 
(June 9, 1552).  Pierre Sautier, a laborer from Chézery but now living in this city, 
was remanded by Master Raymond [Chauvet] because it is proved that he has promised 
[marriage to] two girls.  He denied having broken off anything [with the first woman from 
Chézery] because she had conditioned [that is, she could not accept his proposal] if her 
parents did not consent.  Afterwards he left this woman from Chézery, and she returned 
a sou he had given her for earnest money.  As for the other [woman], who was from 
Présilly, he also left her because the lord of the town to which she is subject wanted to 
compel him to go live in the place and pay him homage, which he did not want to do.  For 
the promise to the first woman, Mollex, Jaquet, and Grandjean were present at his house; 
for the promise to the second, there was a maid of Peytrequin’s who was in the presence 
 
 
50 The Register of the Company of Pastors of Geneva in the Time of Calvin, trans. Philip E. Hughes (Grand 
Rapids, 1966), 64. 
51 Registres du Consistoire de Genève au Temps de Calvin, gen. ed. Robert M. Kingdon, 21 vols. (Geneva, 
1996- ), vols. 1-3 in print; vols. 4-21 (unpublished; transcription is available in the Meeter Center, Calvin 





of the Peytrequin and his wife, and he told them he had sworn faith to the other woman 
and they had separated.   
Decided: considering his confession, that we summon for Thursday the witnesses 
who were at the promise.  He said there was also a carpenter named Pierre Bibet, a 
carpenter near the house of Master Amied Le Barbier, and Mollex, who has always been 
at all his promises, and Jaquet. 
(June 16, 1552) Jaques Danton of Tagnigo, Jean Mollies of Beaumont, and Jean 
Bocquet of Peillonnex, laborer, witnesses against Pierre Sautier, were asked whether 
they know he is married.  They said they were present when Sautier promised [marriage 
to] a girl named Rolanda, then a maid in Bon, who is from Chézery.  It was at his house 
and about Christmas.  They drank together and he gave her a sou; nevertheless she 
made a reservation that she wanted to inform her parents.  Mollies further said that about 
three weeks ago he was at Peytrequin’s, and he [Sautier] also promised [marriage to] a 
maid named Georges, drank, and gave her a sou also.  But afterwards he and she did 
not keep their promise, and he made her return the earnest money.  Afterwards he 
promised [marriage to yet] another woman named Pernette who was a maid of Plonjon’s, 
for which banns are to be proclaimed.  A laborer named Claudon, called Le Neyret, was 
present.  
Decided: that he be remanded before the Council, asking them to get to the bottom 
of the case, since he has promised [marriage] to three wives [i.e., fiancées], and to have 
them called to learn the character of such separations, which are not to be tolerated.  Also 
to learn who were present.  Also Mollies was remanded, who was present at two 
promises.  Also return them their banns.  Note to compare [the records]. 
Document 7 
Case of Guigonne Copponay and Hugo Cant (1556)52 
(August 6, 1556).  Guigonne, daughter of Claude Copponay, and Hugo Cant who 
presented a petition concerning a promise of marriage [between the two of them].  The 
petition stated that she made a condition [of her promise to marriage] of having the advice 
of her parents and that they do not wish to consent to it.  The aforesaid [Cant] said it is 
true, and denied the bulk of the petition.   
 
 





Decided: that they return here for Thursday and bring her parents and that he bring 
Jean Bellet, their host, and the witnesses in her petition to settle it finally.  She will bring 
them; apply to the basket-maker in the Mollard. 
(Aug. 13, 1556). Jean Bellot, Claude de Noyer, Tivent Tornier, and Guigonne 
Copponay were admonished that it has come to notice that they came to a tavern [at 
Bellot’s] against the ordinances and commit insolences there.  They said he has leave for 
it from the Lieutenant, for the day-laborers.  They were also admonished that it has come 
to notice that in Bellot’s cellar a certain promise of marriage was made.  Bellot said that it 
is true that he saw both them and others who drank in his cellar.  They called the girl who 
passed by and made her drink with a carter from the house of the host of the Bear.  [The 
facts are] as [they are stated] in the contents of the petition on her behalf, except that she 
consented and was quite content, and she was admonished to ask her parents.   
Decided: that De Noyer who ... proposed making such a marriage should also be 
remanded before the Council to be punished.  And as for the marriage, it is void and 
fraudulent.  Since the fiancé is from the papacy and she from St. Julien, let everyone 
proceed as they wish concerning them and their carter.  Also Bellot is to be admonished 
for selling [wine] as in a tavern. 
[On August 17 the Council decided to examine the parties more fully, particularly 
whether Guygonne had stipulated that she must get the approval of her relatives.  The 
record says nothing further about this examination.] 
Document 8 
Case of Jean Philippe and Anne Renaud (1554)53 
(Dec. 6, 1554).  Jean Philippe, Jaques Renaud, his wife, and their daughter Anne, 
all masons, were admonished that Philippe presented a petition, whose contents are that 
in the city of Paris they promised him the girl on condition of marrying her where they 
were going, and he gave her a silver ring in marriage.  They confessed it, but now they 
do not want to consent to it, and as for the ring, she returned it to him, and he did not want 
to marry her there.  The girl [Anne] said that she consented to it against the will of her 
mother, which the mother also said.  She was asked separately whether she is promised 
to another; she said no, and as for another ring, said she bought it, asking that she be 
freed from such a promise, because he has boasted of leaving her.   
Decided: that they be exhorted to accomplish the marriage; otherwise, if they do 
not wish to do it, let them be remanded before the Council, and no reason is known why 
such a marriage should be dissolved.  The father said that he asks that he be given strict 
 
 





remonstrances, and that there would be no impediment according to God.  Philippe was 
admonished separately that it has come to notice that he has maligned the [true] religion 
and the city.  He denied it, and promised to be obedient to them. 
Document 9 
Case of Louis Piaget and Fiancée (1545)54 
(Oct. 15, 1545). Louis Piaget and the Bordons’ maid were called to learn about 
their quarrel, because they are engaged, and how it happens that they have broken their 
promise and why they do not want to have the wedding.  Levet’s widow spoke certain 
verbose words about the girl, also about the Bordons.  Also that Donne Claudine provided 
for him fully 200 florins p.p. [petit poids], and it was pledged by Monsieur Julian Bordon, 
or otherwise he did not make the promise, urging the need he has to provide in his 
business for what he owes and endures.   
The girl was asked whether she agrees to marriage and whether the difference is 
only over money.  [She testified that it was] because he says that her father obligated 
himself to Jullian for sum of 200 florins which Bordon had promised to [her prospective] 
husband Piaget. 
Decided: [the prospective] husband was made to withdraw, and the fiancée was 
admonished for having gone back to her father and for having followed their papalist 
practice.   
Decided: Monsieur Claude du Pan took on the duty of making Monsieur Julian 
Bordon, the father, to come here by Thursday, and then a good agreement can be 
reached. 
[A week later Bordon was remanded before the Council for October 26.  On that 
date the Council ordered that the marriage should go into effect and that Bordon should 
pay the “marriage” (that is, the dowry) within three weeks afterwards.] 
Document 10 
Case of Jean de Landéncy and Mia (1546)55 
(March 4, 1546).  [The parties] were admonished to give the reason why they have 
come.  Jean said that the woman promised him in marriage about two to three hundred 
florins, and there were present at the house of Bernard Cloye, tailor, ... Bernard and 
Claude Roch, baker, and Pierre Pricqua.  Mia said she had given him various household 
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goods and carpenter’s tools, as is stated in a list she has presented to us that has been 
read.   
Decided: he confessed having almost all the contents [on the list].  Nevertheless, 
he said he will not marry her if she does not give him what she promised.  They were 
remanded here to Thursday to bring the witnesses. 
(March 11, 1546).  Claude Roch, baker, was admonished and asked to tell the 
truth about what he knows and that he was present at the promise of marriage of Jean 
de Landécy.  He answered that it is true that his fiancée promised to provide him about 
two hundred florins in one way or another – 80 florins cash on the announcement, the 
rest afterwards or at the wedding.  Asked whether a promise of marriage was made, he 
said yes, and that they both swore on the bread. 
Pierre Priccatz was also asked about the above.  He said it is true that Master 
Claude [Roch] asked the fiancée, that is Mia, whether she wanted Jean.  Then she said 
yes, and the promise was made on the bread, and they drank together.  Asked whether 
it was stated that if he did not have the [dowry] money he would not marry her, he said 
he did not hear anything said about that.   
Decided: that they be remanded before the Council and that the promise appears 
to be valid, and that the Council should order the woman to give what she promised to 
her husband.   
The fiancée was called, and was admonished that she was to keep the promise 
that she promised.  She said she wanted to do it.  Asked whether she did not say that she 
would give 24 florins immediately to her husband, she said she will certainly do it, and 
that it [the promise] is secured by a piece of land at Cruseilles.  She said further that 
Guillaume Coustel owes her a certain sum that he denies, and that Coustel asks her for 
proof [of his debt], and that it is on his conscience.   
Jean, the fiancé, was summoned, and was admonished that the marriage and 
promise were made and that he should carry them out and that the woman will give him 
all she can; if not, they are remanded to Monday before the Council. 
[On March 23 the Council summoned them for the following Monday, but the 
resulting decision is not reported.  In January, 1547 Jean de Landécy, grave-digger, had 
still not married Mia.  He was then suspected of theft, and was released on condition that 






Case of Nicolas Adduard and Jehanne Pyto (1546)56 
(April 8, 1546).  Nicolard Adduard of Esserts and Jehanne, widow of the late Jean 
Pyto of Neydens, were admonished and asked the reason why they are here.  He 
responded that he swore faith to and drank in the name of marriage with her.  She denied 
it, and said she was swindled.  Asked whether there were any people present at the 
promise, the husband said there were eight people, among which company was an uncle 
of hers who promised him six score florins and all of their household goods and cattle.  
She excused herself, producing an excusatory petition.   
Decided: that the marriage should not go into effect and that the woman should 
have the two she would most like to have speak about it come, that is her uncle, and with 
him also two of those who were at the promise.  She answered that she cannot bring him 
because he does not dare to cross the bridge because of certain debts.  Here on 
Thursday. 
(April 15, 1546).  Two witnesses produced by Nicolas Adduard of Esserts: Michel 
Gillard of Germagnet and Nicolas Marchant of Esserts [appeared].  Claude, widow of 
Petet of Neydens, was called, and was asked whether she knows anything against these 
witnesses and whether they are relatives of Nicolas Adduard.  She said they are 
respectable people; she does not know about [whether they are] relatives.  Gillard 
answered that he was present in the company when the parties drank together in 
marriage together, and it was stated that she would give him six score florins and more 
and a cow.  Asked whether there was any reservation made, he said no, except that she 
begged that no one yet disturb her brother about it, because he would be angry.   
Asked the reason why he does not complete the marriage begun, he [Nicolas 
Adduard] answered that it is not his fault.  Asked whether he would take her, he said does 
not want her because he would get no money.  He said it depends on the decision of the 
Council.  She does not want to accept marriage.  They were admonished because Nicolas 
told her that he had only three children, and he has four.  Also she promised him six score 
florins p.p. and can give him nothing. They are both found to have lied and cheated.   
Decided: that they be remanded before the Council, declaring to them that there 
is a marriage and about the lies on one side and the other, and praying our Lords to give 
consideration to having edicts [published] concerning marriages. 
 
 





[The following Monday, when called before the Council, Jehanne still opposed the 
marriage, but Nicolas wanted the marriage.  On April 19, the Council finally decided that 
the marriage should be recognized and celebrated.] 
Document 12 
Case of Thomas Bonna and Claudine de Loelmoz (1552-3)57 
(Aug. 30, 1552). Thomas Bonna was admonished why he does not proceed to 
marry his fiancée.  He answered that when he made such a promise she had not reached 
her [age of] majority, and he told them [her family] that he did not want goods but money, 
and did not want land or lawsuits.  He would otherwise not marry her until they gave him 
what they promised, and meanwhile he would serve his uncle Bienvenu until they gave 
him the money.   
Decided: that for Thursday he be remanded before the Council, and despite all his 
excuses it is found that he should proceed with the banns.  And let him bring his witnesses 
before the Council and everything he may use to assist him.... 
(Sept. 21, 1553). Thomas Bonna and Claudine de Loelmoz [appeared]. Claudine 
produced the [Council’s] orders given previously, asking that action be taken on it so the 
matter may be properly concluded.  Thomas still alleges that he did what he did under the 
condition that he get cash.  Afterwards he was read a schedule stating how this same 
Bonna gave [Claudine] golden rings, and that he made her sell stored wine and chests, 
when she was brought to his house.  Bonna said indeed he gave her rings, and as for the 
chests, he did not receive them, but it was done without his command.   
Considering all the procedures and examinations and orders given in Council, 
including the last, [the marriage promise is valid].  Thomas confesses the promise of 
marriage, but maintains that the condition [to marriage has not been met].  But considering 
the gift of rings, [and] that he made her mistress and governor of his goods and house, 
he broke his claimed condition, not holding to it.  And it is evident that he promised 
[marriage], as he confesses.   
It was decided unanimously by the Consistory that it does not appear to them at 
all that this [engagement] may be dissolved.  There is a marriage here which cannot be 
broken off according to God for the reasons given by Thomas.  Also considering that he 
gave her a procuration as from a fiancé to a fiancée, as the procurator Gallatin, who 
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received this procuration, has stated here.  And therefore he is remanded to Monday 
before the Council with the decision aforesaid. 
